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 1.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines the effects of firms’ participation in wireless telecommunications 
industry consortia on their subsequent innovations that become declared essential patents in 
the global UMTS standard for mobile communication. We highlight the increasingly central 
role that these types of technical consortia play in coordinating technology development in 
many different technology fields and industries. Consortia are particularly prevalent in, but 
not limited to, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industries where individual 
products may be associated with thousands of patents and hundreds of compatibility standards 
(WSJ, 2011; Biddle, 2012). 
Compatibility standards are common technology norms that ensure interoperability between 
communication products and services3. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
standards, in particular, embody an increasing number of patented elements. In many ICT 
fields, particularly in telecommunications, standards have traditionally been defined 
cooperatively by governments or industry actors within formal Standard Setting 
Organizations4 (SSOs). However, these formal SSOs are often perceived to be slow and 
bureaucratic, particularly when intellectual property rights have become part of the 
negotiation (Simcoe, 2012; Bekkers et al. 2002). For instance, the 3G wireless telecom 
standard studied here is associated with around 16 000 essential patent disclosures, and its 
development took most of a decade.  
To accelerate the process, sub-groups of firms may create less formal upstream alliances or 
consortia. These types of collaborative organizations offer opportunities to discuss, test, or 
promote certain technologies, or they can be used to actually develop new technical 
specifications that will subsequently be submitted to formal SSOs for official approval. The 
effects of these consortia have been debated in policy circles (e.g., Cargill, 2001) but there is 
little quantitative empirical research evidence. DeLacey et al. (2006) discuss the division of 
labor between formal standardization and informal consortia in the development of WiFi and 
DSL standards, noting that firms may use consortia to influence and accelerate formal 
standardization. Leiponen (2008) suggests that ICT firms’ participation in such consortia 
enhances their ability to influence formal standard-setting outcomes. However, there is no 
                                                        
3
 E.g., mobile phones, DVD content and players, and internet protocols. 
4
 E.g., International Standard Organization, International Telecommunication Union 
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evidence to date about the broader implications of informal consortia for coordination of 
innovation in network-technological industries. The purpose of this paper is to address this 
research gap and conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of ICT consortia on the 
coordination of R&D strategies of the participants. 
Whether consortia facilitate coordination of innovation related to communication standards is 
interesting from both policy and managerial perspectives. From a policy standpoint, our 
results may inform competition policy. The economic literature (Katz and Ordover, 1990; 
Jorde and Teece, 1990; Choi, 1993) often considers collaborative industry organizations as a 
potential threat to competition because of excessive market coordination. However, consortia 
can be socially desirable if they reduce coordination problems around innovation. In this case, 
consortia might mitigate wasteful duplication of effort and increase incentives to invest in 
R&D by internalizing potential externalities (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). These 
arguments could lead competition authorities to adopt a lenient policy with respect to 
standardization consortia, because they might, overall, increase R&D efforts and productivity. 
Our analyses of industry consortia in wireless telecommunications shed new light on the 
process through which communication standards are being created. Development of “open 
standards” through a process that is not truly accessible for all the interested parties may be 
viewed as problematic. To the degree that essential inventions that become incorporated in the 
formal standard are coordinated and agreed in informal and semi-private consortia, 
policymakers may find it worthwhile to better understand and provide rules of the game 
regarding meeting procedures, membership fees particularly for small firms, terms of access, 
and public release of relevant information. Indeed, if consortia are used to coordinate 
innovation in advance of formal standard setting, there is a trade-off between the speed of 
development and representation of the different stakeholders. Monopolization of key 
technologies underpinning a widely used standard is likely to lead to excessive royalties and 
potential holdup that can slow down technology adoption and reduce social welfare. This 
would be equivalent to monopolization of an upstream market in a long and complex value 
chain. 
From a strategic viewpoint, participation in standardization consortia may offer a venue for 
firms to promote their technologies and become central and powerful players in an innovation 
network (Ballester et al. 2006; Fershtman and Gandal, 2011). For instance, from a 
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sociological perspective, Pfeffer (1981) suggests that consortium participation helps firms to 
access and control strategic knowledge. Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence for this 
assertion. Our research aims to highlight strategies that firms may deploy to influence 
innovation by others – particularly innovation related to compatibility standards.  
This paper utilizes a network-analytical approach that examines the effects of one-mode and 
two-mode network connections on subsequent patent citations. A study of two-mode 
networks in open-source software development by Fershtman and Gandal (2011) is closely 
related to ours. We combine membership data from 32 ICT consortia to identify consortium 
network ties between firms involved in formal standardization of wireless telecommunication 
technologies through Third Generation Partnership Project, or 3GPP. 3GPP is the 
international standard-setting organization driving the specification development for the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, UMTS, which is one of the third-generation 
mobile communication systems. Additionally, we compile and analyze citations of 16 000 
essential patents filed by member firms in the 3GPP standardization process for UMTS. These 
data will be used to econometrically assess the effects of firms’ participation in consortia on 
cross-citations of subsequent inventions. To empirically identify the causal relationship, we 
use a merger in the network of consortia as an exogenous event that changed the consortium 
connections of dozens of member firms. 
According to our empirical analysis, patent holders’ involvement in consortia increases the 
likelihood that their patents are cited by other consortium members in subsequent patents that 
are declared essential for the UMTS standard. This result is particularly strong for consortia 
that are technically oriented (as opposed to marketing oriented) or formally allied with and 
thus directly related to 3GPP. The result is significant only for informal consortia and does 
not hold for more formal organizations such as other formal standard-setting organizations 
(e.g., regional SSOs). It also does not hold for other patents than those subsequently declared 
essential for the UMTS standard. The significant relationship we find thus appears to involve 
informal technical consortia and patents closely related to a standard. Finally, a change in the 
network caused by a merger of several consortia had a significant impact on the strength of 
this coordination effect. Our main results are supported by a difference-in-differences analysis 
utilizing this source of exogenous variation.  
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Our results highlight informal technical consortia as an organization form that enables sharing 
of knowledge and coordination of R&D efforts related to compatibility standards in network 
industries. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on consortia and discusses the conceptual foundations of our research. Section 3 
explains the data collection process and the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
2.   Earlier literature on technical consortia and the intended empirical 
contribution 
 
Research and development consortia have been studied extensively in various strands of 
literature. The advantages and drawbacks of these organizations as well as their formation 
process and possible impact on future alliances are now relatively well understood. Here, we 
will review the benefits and costs of participation as discussed in earlier studies, and finish by 
discussing the distinct features and implications of consortia focused on standardization rather 
than just R&D. 
Scholars have found substantial positive effects of consortium participation on innovation by 
firms. For instance, an early stream of research analyzes R&D consortia from a theoretical 
standpoint and underlines financial incentives to participate therein. Katz (1986), Katz and 
Ordover (1990), and d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) view consortia primarily as a means 
to share and reduce R&D expenses.  Consortia may enable scale economies and reduce effort 
duplication among participants. Subsequent studies examine the incentives to participate 
when firms have asymmetric contributions (e.g., Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992). Here, 
R&D investments create knowledge spillovers. Spillovers are positive externalities that 
enhance the social benefits of R&D investments, but they lead to socially suboptimal 
investments because private incentives do not take spillovers into account. Consortia may 
enable the internalization of these spillovers. This positive effect has led some scholars to 
propose public funding of R&D consortia (Romer and Griliches, 1993).  
Two empirical papers confirm that R&D consortia lead to increased R&D investments and 
productivity. First, Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) analyze a sample of Japanese consortia 
and find that the marginal effect of consortium participation  is about two percent increase in 
total R&D spending and between four and eight percent increase in patenting per R&D dollar 
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(research productivity). In a subsequent paper, Sakakibara (2001) finds an even more 
substantial effect of consortium participation on R&D expenses (around 9%) and also finds 
support for the hypothesis that diverse competencies of members enhance the efficiency of the 
consortium, thus leading to greater R&D expenditures by participants (see also Chung, Singh 
and Lee, 1999).  
An organization-theoretic literature suggests that participation in R&D consortia facilitates 
obtaining a strategic advantage over competitors. Pfeffer (1981) proposes that consortium 
participation helps firms to access and control strategic knowledge. Aldrich et al. (1998) also 
argue that R&D consortia could help to orient research in the industry in a way that supports 
the firm’s strategy. This hypothesis is supported empirically by Leiponen (2008) who 
examines consortia around the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), a formal 
standards-development organization. That study finds that participation in technical consortia 
significantly enhances firms’ contributions to new standard specifications in 3GPP 
committees. Firms that are central in the consortium network are ultimately better able to 
influence the standard-setting outcome. From a societal point of view, industry consortia may 
also have adverse effects and are potentially a way to foreclose competition. This potential 
negative effect of consortia on competition has also been discussed in a series of earlier 
papers (e.g. Brodley (1990), Katz and Ordover (1990), Jorde and Teece (1990) and Choi 
(1993).  
Finally, a set of studies identifies consortia as a channel for signaling strategies within the 
industry. In a longitudinal study of 87 cellular service providers and equipment 
manufacturers, Rosenkopf, Metiu and Georges (2001) show that participation in technical 
committees helps to identify potential alliance partners and opportunities for collaboration. 
These authors also find that the marginal effect of consortium participation on alliance 
formation is decreasing with the number of alliances already formed and varies according to 
interpersonal connections. This importance of interpersonal bonds is also underlined by 
Dokko and Rosenkopf (2010), who examine how job mobility of individuals affects firms’ 
abilities to influence others in a technical standard-setting committee for U.S. wireless 
telecommunications. The authors suggest that recruitment of employees with abundant social 
capital in consortium committees increases a firm’s power to influence standard setting 
through such committees. 
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As described above, cooperative research arrangements can be very beneficial, but consortium 
participation may also be associated with risks and costs. First, firms have to support expenses 
such as membership fees, and travel, meeting, and human resource costs. Sakakibara’s (2001) 
analysis of Japanese consortia and Hawkins’ study of ICT consortia (1999) present evidence 
that consortium participation engenders substantial costs. Hawkins’ estimate of membership 
fees for a typical technology firm in the mid-1990s was in the order of 1.5 million US dollars. 
This number does not include the travel and human resource costs of participation. Moreover, 
in the years since this study, membership fees and the number of consortia have considerably 
increased. According to the data cited in DeLacey et al. (2006: 2), it was estimated in 2005 
that IBM’s total standard-setting investments amounted to half a billion US dollars.5 
Consortia can also present risks of technology leakage. Sharing R&D knowledge in technical 
meetings with other participants that have sufficient skills to understand and absorb these 
competencies strongly increases the risks of imitation. Kodama (1986) suggests that firms 
participating in consortia may create internal research groups just to absorb knowledge from 
consortium work. For consortium members, secrecy is thus no longer an effective protection 
method and member firms may need to follow alternative appropriation strategies (e.g., 
Leiponen and Byma (2009). 
To summarize, extant literature on R&D consortia has identified many potential strategic 
benefits and drawbacks of participation and discussed implications for competition policies. 
However, most of the work on consortia has examined R&D consortia, whereas here the 
focus is on standardization-related consortia. These types of collaborative structures are 
increasingly common. We found dozens within wireless communications alone; computing is 
another field where pre-standardization is often organized through informal consortia. The 
well-known battle for dominance in high-definition DVD formats also featured competing 
consortia. The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) maintains a list of over 200 
important international multi-vendor ICT consortia and admits that “Much of the key 
standardization activity in ICT is carried out by industry consortia rather than in formal 
standards organizations such as CEN and ISO.” (CEN, 2012). 
As discussed by Farrell and Saloner (1988: 237), formal standardization committees do many 
things. They share information, design product features, negotiate technical solutions, and 
                                                        
5
 http://www.forbes.com/2005/09/26/ibm-software-investments-cz_qh_0926ibm.html, retrieved on 4/6/2012. 
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carry out performance and compliance tests of the proposed standards and associated 
products. Informal consortia do many of the same things, to varying degrees. Some consortia 
only share information and promote a specific set of technologies, whereas others may 
additionally be actively engaged in joint R&D – designing features and technical 
specifications – the results of which may subsequently be submitted for approval in formal 
standardization organizations such as 3GPP.  
Rules, decision-making processes and antitrust implications of (more) formal standard-setting 
organizations have been discussed in academic literature (e.g., Lemley, 2002; Anton and Yao, 
1995; Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2007) and also scrutinized in antitrust enforcement (e.g., see 
legal references in Lemley, 2002). In contrast, informal industry consortia have rarely been 
examined in detail either by academics or policymakers (but note Cargill’s testimony in 
United States Congress, 2001). In fact, it is often difficult to get information about their inner 
functioning. Because informal consortia are private organizations, little is known about the 
nature and topics of discussion, decision-making procedures, or forms of information 
exchange.  
Strategic knowledge sharing, co-development, and alignment may have long-term 
implications for an industry. In contrast to R&D consortia that also develop technologies for 
the participant firms to offer in their new products or processes, pre-standardization consortia 
may develop technologies and make decisions that not only the participants but also the rest 
of the industry will have to abide by if they build products for the same compatibility 
standard. Early-stage standardization consortia may thus provide a somewhat opaque route to 
domination of a standard for a small subset of firms in the industry.  
Indeed, informal consortia may be aware of the potential competitive implications of their 
activities. The Antitrust Guidelines of one such consortium in our dataset state: “The Forum is 
not a standard-setting organization and neither it nor any committee or member thereof shall 
make any effort to bring about the standardization of any product or service for the purpose or 
with the effect of preventing the manufacture, sale or supply of any product or services not 
conforming to a specified standard(…)” and “To the extent that The Forum through its 
committees and membership, develops or approves specifications which, if followed, will 
permit specific equipment and service to interoperate with any other equipment, service or 
network, adherence to such specifications shall be voluntary on the part of the members of 
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The Forum(…)” (MWIF, 2000). This forum thus explicitly acknowledges that the 
development of formal standards through informal consortia might be detrimental to 
competition. Nevertheless, such voluntarily adopted consortium specifications may be 
successfully fast-tracked in a formal standardization body such as 3GPP, with the described 
effect of foreclosing competition. 
The focus of our empirical work is on the hypothesis that pre-standardization consortia 
facilitate coordination of R&D that results in essential inventions related to a compatibility 
standard. If this is true, then these types of consortia may support and structure the 
identification of early-stage investments that enable controlling the standard later on. In the 
language of Farrell and Saloner (1988), consortia may be viewed as a “hybrid” coordination 
structure that combines market-based and committee-based processes of standardization. 
Consortia facilitate firms’ attempts to both mobilize a market bandwagon and to negotiate and 
coordinate technical features with rivals. Technical meeting discussions in consortia enable 
negotiation and coordination, whereas competition among consortia and broader adoption of 
their proposals may help set off a bandwagon effect. Farrell and Saloner’s theoretical work 
suggests that consortia can be welfare improving because they are likely to speed up 
coordination. However, their analysis does not examine the implications of restricted access 
to the early-stage processes or monopolization of the IP market (but see Simcoe and Farrell, 
2011). 
Policy makers such as those in the European Commission have expressed concerns that 
private consortia tend to be closed and undemocratic (Egyedi, 2001). Industry practitioners 
have also suggested that informal consortia tend to be founded by a core group of members 
who fix the agenda and the bylaws before others are allowed to join, often preserving 
membership tiers that separate founders from general members. Many consortia such as the 
Open Mobile Alliance included in the sample here also have multiple levels of membership 
differentiated by a steep fee structure, whereby it can be prohibitively expensive for smaller 
firms to participate in the “sponsor” levels, whereas members on lower levels are likely to be 
excluded from committee chairpersonships, formal votes, or rights to submit technical 
appeals. 
As discussed by Anton and Yao (1995), agenda control alone can be a significant source of 
power. Moreover, dispute resolution mechanisms analyzed by Chiao, Lerner and Tirole 
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(2006) are usually missing from informal consortia (such as WAP Forum that is included in 
their analyses and in the sample here). Then, if the basic technological approaches have 
already been selected at founding to support the competitive advantages of the founders, it can 
be difficult for newcomers to change the technical specifications already under way.  
Echoing the statement by CEN cited earlier, Hawkins (1999) notes that, in 
telecommunications, “an international system has evolved in which communication and co-
ordination is achieved primarily through inter-organisational alliances[…]” (also see Aldrich 
et al., 1998). However, systematic empirical evidence regarding firms’ innovation and 
standardization strategies therein and their economic implications remains scarce. Our paper 
targets this research gap by examining the role played by consortia as vehicles for 
coordination of innovation in the context of ICT standardization. Specifically, we are 
interested in the degree to which communication in early-stage technical consortia drives 
innovation that becomes incorporated in formal standard specifications in a later stage. 
3.   Data and Methods 
 
Our main empirical model tests whether consortium participation by a firm increases the 
likelihood that its patent is cited by other members of the same consortia in their patents that 
are declared as essential for the wireless telecommunication system UMTS. We thus analyze 
whether the likelihood that a patent is cited depends on the position and centrality of the 
patent holder in the network of consortia in the year in which the citing patent was applied. 
We test for the effect of consortium connections on the likelihood of citation at the level of 
cited patents and at the level of firm pairs. 
We assume that patent citations primarily represent spillovers of technical knowledge, but we 
also consider the possibility that citations may be strategic and reflect strategic alignment 
among firms. According to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001:15), a prior art citation is 
essentially an acknowledgement that the invention builds on an aspect of a prior invention 
over which the new invention cannot have a claim. A prior art citation thus delimits and 
defines the breadth of an invention. At the same time, a citation also increases the probability 
that a patent is found to be valid (Allison and Lemley, 1998). Lampe (2012) suggests that 
strategic citation is widespread; ICT firms strategically leave out up to 41% of relevant and 
known citations to patents that they decide to ignore in an attempt to maximize the returns on 
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their own R&D investments. For the purposes of our study, we assume that the reason why 
co-memberships in consortia may induce cross-citations of patents is that firms learn technical 
information from each other in the consortium working groups and become more likely to 
build on each other’s inventions. However, by comparing different types of consortia 
(technically vs. marketing oriented) and different types of firms (operating companies and 
non-practicing entities) we also assess the possibility that citations are primarily strategic.  
We focus on citations by patents that subsequently become declared as essential for the 
UMTS standard, because we are interested in the ability of consortium activities to influence 
the set of technologies that become incorporated in the standard, but we also test the effects 
on citations from a broader set of patents by the same firms, and on total numbers of essential 
patents.  
This paper relies on a combination of data on consortium co-membership links between firms 
involved in the third-generation mobile standards and cross-citations of patents filed by these 
participants. First of all, we gathered data on 16 000 patents declared essential for the UMTS 
standard6. We retrieved these data in October 2010 using the ETSI online patent database7. 
We then merged these data with information on citations using the 1976/2006 National 
Bureau of Economic Research database8 and used the EPIP database to identify the patent 
holders of the cited patents9. Appendices 1 and 2 present some information about the timing 
of application and technological class of patents in our sample. The citing patents are very 
concentrated in terms of technological class, whereas the cited patents are quite diverse. The 
cited patents were granted between 1976 and 2004 but the majority of them were granted in 
the late 1990s or early 2000s.   
Next, we created a database on consortium membership links between firms involved in third-
generation mobile standards. This database is partly based on Leiponen (2008). Consortia 
were initially identified from press releases by wireless technology companies and from 
existing consortium lists compiled by Updegrove (2010), Chiao et al. (2007) and CEN (2012), 
and by examining whether the technology is relevant for wireless communications and 
whether some members of 3GPP were also members of the consortia. Using the Internet 
                                                        
6
 The projects included are : 3GPP, 3GPP release 7, 3GPP/AMR-WB+, UMTS, UMTS Release 5, UMTS 
Release 6, UMTS Release 7, UMTS Release 8, UMTS/CDMA 
7
 Available at: http://ipr.etsi.org/ 
8
 Available at: http://www.nber.org/patents/ 
9
 Available at: http://www.epip.eu/datacentre.php 
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Archive, we obtained data on the memberships of the patent holders (owners of the citing and 
the cited patents) in ICT consortia from 2000 to 2005. Some of these consortia are formally 
allied with 3GPP as organizational or marketing partners, and others are unrelated or even 
directly competing with 3GPP. A list of these consortia is presented in Appendix 3. A handful 
of relevant consortia had blocked their historical websites from the Archive and we were 
unable to retrieve their membership rosters. 
As we have information on participation in consortia from 2000 to 2005, we will restrict our 
analysis of citing patents applied in this period. We organize our database around the cited 
patents over six years. This database consists of 1046 patents that were cited at least once by a 
UMTS essential patent between 1998 and 2005. These patents were held by 43 different 
firms10. The database connects the cited patents with 1962 citing patents, held by 17 firms.  
We first examine the research question using cited patents as our unit of analysis. Our 
dependent variable here is a binary indicator for whether a patent was cited by a patent 
application that was subsequently declared as essential for the UMTS wireless 
telecommunication system developed in 3GPP. We use two different explanatory variables to 
capture firms’ participation in pre-standardization consortia. These two variables measure the 
patent holder’s general level of participation in consortia of the ICT field: the number of 
consortium memberships, (total memberships) and the number of unique connections to peers 
from consortia (consortium connections). A consortium connection is formed if two firms 
meet in at least one of the consortia during the year. In network-analytical terms these are 
two-mode and one-mode degree centrality measures, respectively (cf. Fershtman and Gandal, 
2011). We include a control variable to proxy for firms’ formal standardization strategies. We 
trace patent holders’ activities in the standards-development committees of 3GPP11 and create 
the 3GPP connections variable that equals the number of unique connections (one-mode 
degree centrality) to other firms through work-item committees. This variable allows us to 
take into account the centrality of the firm in formal standard setting and thus to distinguish 
the effects of informal and formal standardization strategies on cross-citations. We also 
include patent age dummies to control for the evolution of citation patterns over time. We 
estimate the following model: 
                                                        
10
 A list of the patent holders of the cited patents is presented in appendix 4.  
11
 Using the website http://www.3gpp.org/ 
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)Pr( pitCitation  = Probability of patent p held by firm i being cited by another 3GPP 
participant’s patent application in year t   
Consortium participationit = Participation in consortia of firm i, using the variables total 
membership and consortium connections
 
in year t
 
3GPP connectionsit = Firm i’s one-mode degree centrality in formal standardization in 3GPP 
committees in year t  
Patent agept = Set of dummies for the cited patent age 
ptε = Error term 
Table 1 describes the main estimation variables. 
Table 1: Name and description of the main explanatory variables 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Total membershipsit Number of cited firm’s annual 
memberships (two-mode network 
degree) in consortia 
8.11 6.65 0 24 
Consortium 
connectionsit 
Number of cited firm’s annual 
unique connections (one-mode 
network degree) through consortia 
124.16 99.23 0 280 
3GPP connectionsi t Number of unique (one-mode 
degree) connections to other firms 
through 3GPP work-item (formal 
standardization) committees 
16.02 17.73 0 63 
Patent applications Number of patent applications 651.65 614.91 0 5312 
Patent age dummies Set of dummies for the age of the 
cited patent 
    
 
We thus work with a panel database of patents cited by at least one UMTS essential patent 
and estimate a fixed-effect conditional logit model with the likelihood to be cited at year t for 
patent p as the dependent variable. Table 2 presents the numbers of years in which the patents 
in our sample are cited between 1998 and 2005. The dataset contains a small number of 
patents that were cited every year during the period of study (2000-2005). Firms with the 
greatest number of patents cited in five or more years include Qualcomm (29 such patents), 
Motorola (16 patents), InterDigital (14), AT&T Wireless (12) followed by NEC, Siemens, 
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and Mitsubishi. Patents that are cited many times and over a long period of time are likely to 
represent fundamental inventions in the standardized communication system. 
Table 2: Number of years the patent is cited (1998-2005) 
 
Number of years the patent 
is cited 
Observations 
1 547 
2 268 
3 86 
4 43 
5 64 
6 12 
7 23 
8 3 
 
The main empirical issue is to disentangle the effects of participation in consortia and 
technological strategies of firms. A patent can be highly cited because of the patent holders’ 
participation in consortia or because the invention is technologically central in the UMTS 
wireless system being standardized within 3GPP, for which reason its holder may participate 
in many consortia. Innovations emerging during the period of study thus might make firms 
more likely to both attend certain consortia and cite their central members. In order to control 
for these confounding factors, we deploy a number of empirical tactics: we include a control 
variable for firms’ formal standardization strategies; we utilize standard panel-data methods 
(fixed effects estimation) to remove time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity; and we utilize 
an exogenous source of variation to reduce potential time-variant unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, the last approach only works for our main result regarding whether industry 
consortia influence subsequent standards-related innovation. For identification of the 
additional results on the types of consortia, we need to rely on the two former approaches. 
The exogenous event we exploit for identification is a merger of seven industry consortia that 
shifted the consortium connections of some but not all firms in our dataset. In late 2002, seven 
of the consortia in our database12 merged to create the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). OMA 
was formed by nearly 200 companies including mobile operators, device and network 
suppliers, information technology companies and content and service providers.  Therefore 
we argue that individual firms were unlikely to have substantial influence in the merger. The 
                                                        
12
 Wap Forum, Wireless Village, SyncML Initiative, MGIF, LIF, MWIF, and UMTS Forum. 
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stated reasons for the merger were increasing interactions and synergies between the 
technology fields of the seven component consortia: “The purpose of OMA is to address areas 
that previously fell outside the scope of any existing organizations, as well as streamline work 
that may have been previously duplicated by multiple organizations.”13 As a result of the 
merger, consortium connections of some firms increased and those of other firms decreased. 
We use this merger to estimate a differences-in-differences model and examine the robustness 
of our fixed-effects results.  
4.  Estimation results 
 
We first run a fixed-effect model estimating the likelihood of a patent to be cited by another 
patent that was declared as essential for the UMTS standard, held by another consortium 
participant. We control for the age of the cited patent. The results of this model are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: The effect of consortium participation on the likelihood of citation 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
 Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratio 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratio 
(SE) 
Total memberships 0.0341* 1.0347*   
 (0.019) (0.019)   
Consortium connections   0.0028** 1.0028** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
3GPP connections 0.0128 *** 1.0129*** 0.0168*** 1.0169*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Patent age dummies Y Y 
Observations 6184 6184 
Groups 1043 1043 
Chi2 685.09 689.66 
Prob > chi2 0 0 
Log Likelihood -1575.19 -1572.85 
Cited firms 43 43 
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a patent was cited by an essential patent applied in year t. 
Estimation method is conditional logit with fixed effects at the patent level. Unit of analysis is the cited patent. 
Standard errors, clustered on patents, in parentheses under the coefficients. * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
                                                        
13
 http://www.openmobilealliance.org/AboutOMA/FAQ.aspx, retrieved 8/2/2002. 
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According to the basic fixed-effects results at the level of the cited patent as shown in table 3, 
the two main explanatory variables, the cited patent holder’s total number of memberships in 
wireless industry consortia and their unique consortium connections to peers both have at 
least weakly statistically significant and positive effects on the likelihood of a patent to be 
cited by another consortium participant. Odds ratios suggest that one additional membership 
increases the odds of citation by 3.5%, whereas one additional connection increases the odds 
of citation by 0.3%. These effects are aligned in the sense that one additional membership 
may generate dozens of new connections. The coefficient of 3GPP connections that controls 
for firms’ connections to peers through formal standardization activities is significant and 
positive, suggesting that similar information is exchanged in formal standards committees (cf. 
Bekkers et al. 2011). 
Next, we use the exogenous event, a merger of seven consortia in 2002, to examine the 
robustness of our main result. When Mobile Games Interoperability Forum (MGIF), UMTS 
Forum, WAP Forum, Wireless Village, SyncML Initiative, Location Interoperability Forum 
(LIF) and Mobile Wireless Internet Forum (MWIF) merged to form Open Mobile Alliance, 
the consortium connections of the members of the seven consortia were exogenously shifted. 
Firms included in the control group who were members of none of the consortia affected by 
the merger are listed in appendix 5. We thus dissect the participation effect found in table 3 
with respect to timing and OMA vs. other consortia. The results are presented in table 4. 
The OMA connections variable (number of unique connections through OMA or its 
constituent consortia) has a positive and statistically significant effect on citations. OMA and 
the component consortia were thus probably central venues for discussing ongoing 
innovation. In fact, the effect of connections from other consortia (other connections) is 
statistically insignificant here. The most relevant coefficient in table 4 is that on the variable 
OMA connections after that measures the additional effect of OMA-related connections after 
the merger. This effect is statistically borderline significant at the 5% level in the two 
specifications.  
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Table 4: Impact of the OMA merger on subsequent citations 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratio 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratio 
(SE) 
OMA connections 0.0028** 1.0028** 0.0036*** 1.0036*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Other consortium 
connections 
0.0003 1.0003 0.0001 1.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
OMA connections after 
 
0.0045** 1.0045** 0.0042* 1.0042* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy after 
 
-2.0055*** 0.1346*** -2.0851*** 0.1243*** 
 
(0.262) (0.035) (0.266) (0.033) 
3GPP connections 
 
  -0.0097** 0.9904*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Patent age dummies Y Y 
Observations 6184 6184 
Groups 1043 1043 
Chi 2 742.75 785.07 
Prob > chi2 0 0 
Log Likelihood -1500.01 -1479.32 
Cited firms 
 
43 43 
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a patent was cited by an essential patent applied in year t. 
Estimation method is conditional logit with fixed effects at the patent level. Standard errors, clustered on patents, 
are in parentheses under the coefficients.  * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
In table 5 we return to the basic fixed-effect approach to further distinguish the effects of 
different types of consortia, which we cannot examine with the diff-in-diff method because 
OMA and its constituent consortia are all informal and technical in nature. We first 
distinguish between formal and informal consortia. Formal consortia are standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs) that draft and certify formal standards whereas informal consortia may 
develop, discuss, test, and promote technological alternatives, but they submit their 
specifications (if any) to formal SSOs for certification. We expect informal consortia to be 
more conducive to influencing peers, because their less formal and structured ex-ante 
discussions can be more easily used to promote the members’ technologies that might be 
utilized or built on in the formal standard-setting context of 3GPP.  
Consortia can also be formally allied (related) with 3GPP or unrelated with 3GPP. We assume 
that consortia that were listed as the organizational or marketing partners of 3GPP on its 
website are closely related. We expect consortia that are allied with 3GPP to provide more 
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fruitful venues for influencing peers’ innovation activities related to technologies that 3GPP 
standardizes, because the technologies concerned are more likely to be related, too.  
The third distinction is between consortia that are technical or marketing-oriented in nature. 
From each consortium’s historical website we obtained information about whether its 
activities involved drafting of technical specifications. We assume these consortia are 
involved in feeding technical feature ideas and specification proposals to 3GPP, and thus 
potentially have a direct impact on the standards that are certified in 3GPP. In contrast, 
marketing-oriented consortia primarily promote the technologies concerned by providing 
information for the media and by lobbying governments and other decisionmakers. They also 
may carry out interoperability testing and certification, but do not develop technical 
specifications.  
We expect that technical consortia are more conducive than marketing consortia to technical 
spillovers that influence subsequent patenting of inventions. We also argue that this 
distinction sheds some light on the question of the degree of strategic citation. One would 
expect that if strategic citation to increase the likelihood of patent validity is driving our 
dependent variable, both types of consortia should be useful contexts for strategic interactions 
and alignment. In contrast, if knowledge spillovers rather than strategic citation are primarily 
driving citations, then technical consortia should be more conducive to them. 
We also examine the moderating effect of the technological resources of the patent holder 
using an interaction variable, consortium connections*patent apps, that is, consortium 
connections multiplied by the number of patents applied by the cited firm during the year. 
This variable allows us to assess the potential moderating impact of the (technological) size of 
the patent holder on the consortium participation effect. We expect that larger technology 
firms are more effective at translating consortium connections into opportunities to influence 
others’ innovation activities. The sheer volume of technological resources such as patents and 
experts is expected to enhance the power to influence peers. 
Regarding the types of consortia, the results in table 5 confirm expectations. Memberships in 
informal consortia statistically significantly explain citations whereas the coefficient of 
memberships in formal standardization organizations is insignificant. The coefficient and 
odds ratio of formal consortia are actually larger but they are much less precisely estimated.  
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Similarly confirming expectations, the strategic and technological scope of the consortium 
influences the intensity of the effect of consortium memberships. Consortia that are related to 
3GPP are driving the overall effect. The effect is essentially zero for unrelated consortia.  
 
Table 5: Effects of different types of consortia and the moderating effect of technological 
resources  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratios Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds 
ratios 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds 
ratios 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds 
ratios 
Informal consortium 
memberships 
0.0027** 1.0027**     
(0.001) (0.001)    
Formal consortium 
memberships 
0.0039 1.0039    
(0.004) (0.004)    
Related consortium 
memberships 
  0.0156*** 1.0158***  
  (0.003) (0.003)  
Unrelated consortium 
memberships 
  -0.0003 0.9997  
  
(0.0002) (0.0002)  
Marketing consortium     0.0422 1.0432   
memberships     (0.041) (0.042)   
Technical consortium     0.1915*** 1.2110***   
memberships     (0.017) (0.020)   
Consortium 
connections 
    
  
-0.0001 0.9999 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Cons. connections* 
patent apps 
    
  
  2.83e-06** 1.0000** 
      (1.14e-06) (1.14e-06) 
Patent apps       -0.0005* 0.9995* 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) 
3GPP connections 0.0171*** 1.0173*** 0.0111*** 1.0112*** 0.0142*** 1.0143*** 0.0133*** 1.0134*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Patent age dummies 
Observations 
Groups  
Chi2 
Prob > chi2 
Log Likelihood 
Cited firms 
Y 
6184 
1043 
694.39 
0 
-1572.77 
43 
Y 
6184 
1043 
689.77 
0 
-1554.412 
43 
Y 
6184 
1043 
857.61 
0 
-1811.963 
43 
Y 
5864 
1041 
631.59 
0 
-1535.47 
43 
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a patent was cited by an essential patent applied in year t. 
Estimation method is conditional logit with fixed effects at the patent level. Unit of analysis is cited patent. 
Standard errors, clustered on patents, are in parentheses under the coefficients. * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
The third specification in table 5 splits the consortium memberships to those in technical and 
marketing consortia. As expected, the effect of technical consortia is much larger and 
statistically more significant than that of marketing consortia. This supports our assumption 
that spillovers rather than purely strategic citing behaviours are driving subsequent citations.  
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In the last specification in table 5 we find that firms’ technological resources (measured by 
annual patent applications) statistically significantly moderate the consortium participation 
effect on the likelihood to be cited in subsequent patents by peers. However, the odds ratios 
seem economically insignificant, partly because the mean number of patent applications is in 
the hundreds and many of the sampled firms have thousands of annual applications. A single 
additional patent application has only a negligible effect on the odds of citation, but hundreds 
of additional patent applications may already begin to amplify the effect of consortium 
connections. Our hypothesis that larger technology firms are more effective at translating 
consortium connections into opportunities to influence others’ innovation activities is thus 
weakly supported. The moderating effect probably is meaningful only for very large 
technology firms. 
In robustness analyses at the cited patent level, we tested whether the consortium coordination 
effect also matters for 3GPP members’ patents that are not declared as essential for the UMTS 
standard. We found no significant effect on non-essential patents, even though we focused on 
patents in the same wireless technology classes. Thus, our results suggest pre-standardization 
consortia are an effective way to coordinate R&D around the relevant compatibility standards 
but not more generally to influence innovation in the same technological classes.  We also 
examined whether the consortium variables enhance the productivity of invention per se. The 
literature on R&D consortia (e.g., Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998) suggest that shared R&D 
in consortia enables firms to internalize knowledge externalities and hence enhance the 
productivity of R&D. We found mixed evidence for this idea. Whereas consortium 
connections are positively associated with subsequent production of essential patents, the 
result is not corroborated by the differences-in-differences analysis. Hence, our results do not 
provide strong support for the idea that standardization consortia also enhance the 
productivity of invention. 
Because fixed-effects estimation considerably reduces the number of observations, we also 
estimated with a random-effects specification taking into account the overall sample and 
using mean variables to control for permanent characteristics (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 487-
488, 679). This Chamberlain-style procedure includes the means of the time-varying 
explanatory variables as additional regressors in the random-effects procedure, assuming that 
the permanent characteristics are normally distributed conditional on the explanatory 
variables. According to Wooldridge (2002), this method is less robust but more efficient than 
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the conditional fixed-effects approach. The results are presented in appendix 6 and confirm 
the findings of the fixed-effects estimation. We also checked the robustness of our results 
using a linear probability model. These results are presented in appendix 7 and confirm the 
findings presented in the body of the paper, with one exception: according to the linear 
probability model, formal consortia are more important for subsequent innovation than are 
informal consortia. Finally, we checked whether our results are driven by patents that are 
cited only once over the study period by other 3G participants. Excluding these patents in a 
robustness test did not change our results. 
To summarize our analyses at the cited patent level, our main hypothesis that participation in 
technical consortia facilitates coordination of firms’ innovation policies is supported. This 
result is robust to the choice of method and variable used to capture the participation effect. 
The magnitude of the effect depends on the nature of the consortia. In the conditional logit 
estimations, the coordination effect is economically and statistically more significant for 
informal rather than formal consortia, for consortia that are technologically and strategically 
related rather than unrelated to 3GPP, and for technical rather than marketing-oriented 
consortia. Finally, we exploited a merger in the set of consortia to check the statistical 
identification of the main coordination effect. Exogenous changes in consortium connections 
caused by the merger positively and statistically significantly influenced subsequent citations 
by peers. 
We next conduct an analysis at the firm-pair level of the impact of co-memberships in 
informal industry consortia on the likelihood of cross-citation. This approach follows the 
analysis of cooperation among universities by Agrawal and Goldfarb (2008). The dataset is 
now set up as a panel of possible firm pairs from the list of 47 firms that ever cite other 3GPP 
members’ patents or whose patents ever get cited by other members. The full panel has six 
years and 47*47-47 observations each year (we account for the direction of citation and 
exclude self citations). We thus have almost 13000 firm-pair-years in total, but in estimations 
we narrow this sample down to more relevant sets of observations. We also restrict the 
analysis to the years between 2000 and 2003 to focus on the OMA merger “treatment” 
impact.  
In all specifications, we exclude pairs where the potentially cited firm has never actually been 
cited during the period of study, because these may include firms that did not have relevant 
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intellectual property prior to the study period. We then have 7912 firm-pair observations over 
the four-year period. Table 6 provides means and cross-tabulations for these data. Citation 
from firm j to firm i is a rare occurrence; only 4.6% of the firm-pair-year observations are 
associated with a citation. Consortium activities, in contrast, are quite common. 50.5% of firm 
pairs include firms that are co-members of either OMA (after 2001) or a consortium that 
merged with OMA in 2002 (for 2000-2001). 60.9% of firm-pair-years have firms that are both 
members in the same informal consortia, other than OMA or its constituent consortia. The 
cross-tabulations show a strong correlation between citation and OMA-related co-
membership, and between OMA and other consortia co-memberships. The correlation 
between co-membership in other consortia and cross-citation is also positive but less 
pronounced. 
 
Table 6: Sample statistics for the firm-level co-membership analysis (2000-2003;N=7912) 
 
OMA co-
membership 
Other consortia 
co-membership Citation 
Variable Mean 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Citation 0.046 0.033 0.058 0.037 0.051 NA NA 
OMA co-membership 0.505 NA NA 0.214 0.691 0.498 0.642 
Consortia co-membership 0.609 0.380 0.834 NA NA 0.605 0.680 
 
In table 7 we present differences-in-differences results from the analysis of the impact of 
consortium co-memberships on the likelihood of citation from patent of firm j to a patent of 
firm i. The empirical setting is not ideal because of the few positive observations of the 
dependent variable (4.6%) and for this reason the estimation model is kept as simple as 
possible. We find that the key explanatory variable capturing OMA co-membership after 2001 
is positive and statistically significant in most specifications. Thus, two firms that became 
OMA co-members because of the merger were significantly more likely to cite each other’s 
patents. According to odds ratios for specification 1 (not reported in the table), compared to a 
situation where firms are not members of OMA consortia, a co-membership in OMA or its 
predecessor consortia increases the odds that a firm pair experiences a cross-citation by 33%, 
whereas a co-membership in OMA after 2001 increases these odds by 90%. These numbers 
appear to be very high, but considering that the raw probability of citation is very low, then 
even with the increased odds the risk of citation remains fairly low. These results are 
reasonably robust to the exclusion of pairs where the potential citing firm has never actually 
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cited another 3GPP member firm’s patents in its essential patents (accounting for the concern 
that some firms may not be “at risk” of sending a citation to 3GPP peers) and to the addition 
of fixed effects for cited firms. These results are reported in specifications 2 and 3. 
In all specifications we control for co-memberships in other informal consortia, because they 
will reflect the general tendency of firms in this field to join industry consortia. In earlier 
estimations, and also in correlation analyses within the current sample, the relationship 
between other informal consortium connections and cross-citations is rather strong, but in the 
estimation models here, the coefficient of co-memberships in other consortia is usually 
insignificant. This is in part influenced by the multicollinearity between OMA and other 
consortia co-memberships: firms that join OMA-related consortia are also likely to join other 
informal consortia. The collinearity between OMA and other co-memberships is less severe in 
earlier years of the study period, because of the lower concentration of citing firms. Hence, if 
we exclude the year 2003 from the analyses, this variable becomes statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, even when this variable is excluded, the coefficients of OMA variables retain 
their levels of significance, and hence the main results are not affected by the 
multicollinearity. 
The last specification in table 7 includes dummies (fixed effects) for the citing firms. Whereas 
there are 43 firms whose patents were cited during our period of study, there are only 17 firms 
from which citations originate, so this end of the cross-citation network is highly 
concentrated. Bekkers, Bongard and Nuvolari (2011) make similar observations about these 
data. In table 7, we are able to identify 13 citing firm dummies for the period 2000-2003. In 
this specification, the OMA co-membership and the other consortia co-membership variables 
have positive and statistically significant effects, but the coefficient of OMA co-membership 
after the merger becomes insignificant. This seems to be driven by the concentration of citing 
firms, particularly after 2001. In our essential patent database, we have 367 essential patents 
applied in 2002 with citations to earlier patents by 3GPP members. Of these 367 citations, full 
87% are made by one of two firms, InterDigital and Qualcomm. In 2003 the share of citations 
by these two firms is even higher, 96%.14 Thus, their firm dummies capture all the statistically 
relevant information about the likelihood of citation among firm pairs after 2001. For the 
same reasons, we cannot identify any effect of consortia co-memberships after including firm-
                                                        
14
 Before 2002, the shares of InterDigital and Qualcomm were somewhat smaller; for example, in 2000, there 
were 12 citing firms and the shares of InterDigital and Qualcomm were 30% and 31%, respectively. 
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pair fixed effects. Nevertheless, the other co-membership variables still suggest that there is a 
strong relationship between consortia and citations.  
Although the statistical analysis of the effects of firm-pair co-memberships is hampered by 
data concentration, these data are interesting from the perspective of individual firms’ 
competitive strategies. Qualcomm and InterDigital are not the most active citing firms by 
chance; they are the only firms in the sample that have followed a business model primarily 
focused on commercialization of intellectual property (although Qualcomm also produces 
chipsets that are components for mobile phones). Whereas the likes of Nokia, Matsushita, and 
Motorola were very active in IP creation, enforcement, and trading, they were primarily 
manufacturers of network or terminal equipment. At the time of this study, Qualcomm was 
primarily an IP provider, and InterDigital was purely so.  
We interpret these data as indirect evidence of the implications of different business models 
through strategic behavior in terms of essential patent declarations. One interpretation for 
these data and estimation results is that InterDigital and Qualcomm actively utilize 
discussions in industry consortia to assess how the UMTS compatibility standard will evolve 
in the near term, and then attempt to place their own stakes in the IP space by patenting 
inventions and declaring them (potentially) essential for the standard.  
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Table 7 : Probability of citation between firms i and j: differences-in-differences approach 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  
Citation 
Coef. 
(SE) 
OR  
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
OR  
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
OR  
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
OR  
(SE) 
Constant -2.805 -1.277***  -3.853***  -3.036***  
(0.164) (0.166)  (0.713)  (0.471)  
OMA co-membership 0.290** 1.336** 0.259 1.296 0.196 1.216 0.437** 1.549** 
(0.139) (0.186) (0.169) (0.219) (0.167) (0.203) (0.220) (0.341) 
 OMA co-membership 0.642** 1.900** 0.532* 1.703* 0.644** 1.904** -0.137 0.872 
after 2001 (0.265) (0.504) (0.280) (0.477) (0.270) (0.514) (0.322) (0.281) 
Consortia co-membership 0.208 1.231 0.222 1.249 -0.250 0.779 1.208*** 3.348*** 
(0.153) (0.188) (0.184) (0.230) (0.170) (0.132) (0.248) (0.831) 
Coding Technologies       0.511 1.667 
    (0.616) (1.028) 
Ericsson       1.027** 2.793** 
    (0.423) (1.181) 
InterDigital       4.265*** 71.181*** 
    (0.524) (37.274) 
IP Wireless       -0.210 0.811 
    (0.742) (0.601) 
Matsushita       1.219*** 3.384*** 
    (0.460) (1.558) 
Mitsubishi       -1.522** 0.218** 
    (0.665) (0.145) 
Motorola       -1.091* 0.336* 
    (0.560) (0.188) 
NEC       -0.338 0.713 
    (0.513) (0.366) 
Nokia       1.275*** 3.580*** 
    (0.413) (1.479) 
Nortel Networks       0.872* 2.393* 
    (0.451) (1.078) 
Qualcomm       3.099*** 22.183*** 
    (0.461) (10.220) 
Tantivy Communications       0.186 1.204 
    (0.479) (0.577) 
Texas Instruments       (omitted)  
Observations 7912 2196  7912  2196  
Notes: Dependent variable: binary for citation from j to i. All specifications exclude pairs where firm i was never 
cited during 2000-2003. Specification (2) also excludes pairs where firm j never cited patents of other 3GPP 
members in 2000-2003. Specification (3) adds fixed effects (dummies) for cited firms. Specification (4) adds 
dummies for citing firms that are listed on the lower part of the table. Estimation method is logit with 
differences-in-differences variables to utilize the exogenous variation from the merger of consortia that led to 
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) in 2002. 2000-2001 is the pre-merger period and 2002-2003 is the post-merger 
period. Year dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. 
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However, while doing so, they may strategically make citations to consortium peers’ earlier 
patents to pre-emptively limit their own short-term returns but also to reduce the likelihood of 
validity challenges. Lampe (2012) suggests that firms are more likely to cite relevant prior art 
when the invented technology is expected to be very profitable and less likely to do so when 
their own portfolio is very large and they can effectively defend their patents. The business 
models of both Qualcomm and InterDigital are in fundamental ways based on inserting 
patents into wireless standards, which can result in some extremely profitable patents. Their 
patent portfolios are also substantially smaller than those of many of their wireless technology 
peers. Hence, one might expect them to be extraordinarily active in citing wireless peers’ 
prior art, which they may learn about in consortium discussions. Although their citation 
incentives are attenuated by their non-practicing entity status in wireless technologies for 
which reason they might pursue more aggressive litigation strategies than operating company 
peers, they are very highly dependent on the validity of their patents. 
We conclude these analyses by noting that co-memberships in consortia, particularly those 
related to Open Mobile Alliance, are significantly associated with the likelihood of cross-
citation among 3GPP member firms in their essential patents. If a firm attended a relevant 
technical consortium, other members of the same consortium were significantly more likely to 
cite its earlier patents in their own current patents that eventually led to essential IP 
declarations. Thus, this firm-pair-level analysis highlights the mechanism that generates the 
results in the earlier patent-level panel analyses. However, there are some empirical 
challenges with these analyses.  
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First, the raw probability of citation is very low because relatively few firm pairs generate 
cross-citations. Second, the citing behavior is highly concentrated, which hinders the 
statistical analysis. Most firms in the dataset (firms whose patents ever cite or get cited) have 
rather few cited patents or cite few patents of other firms, whereas the two leading IP firms, 
Qualcomm and InterDigital, dominate the activity and are thus associated with enormous 
fixed effects. Their strategies highlight the implications of business models. With respect to 
wireless communication technologies, these two firms operate almost exclusively in the IP 
market rather than the product market, for which reason their strategic drivers are very 
different from most other firms who also manufacture products. Nevertheless, industry 
consortia, including the OMA consortium after the merger of seven constituent consortia, 
appear to be central venues in which these and other firms learn about technologies related to 
the UMTS standard on which they subsequently build further inventions. 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of firms’ participation in ICT consortia on knowledge sharing 
and coordination of innovation strategies related to compatibility standards. We use data on 
participation in 32 ICT consortia and prior art citations in essential patents filed by 
participants in the 3GPP standardization process. To empirically identify the effect of 
consortium connections, we exploit a merger in the network of consortia as a quasi-
experiment that exogenously changed consortium connections of members. 
Our empirical analysis highlights the impact of the patent holder’s position in the consortium 
network on the likelihood of having its patents cited by other participants in subsequent 
research. The more central the firm is in the consortium network, the greater the likelihood of 
its patents being cited by other firms in subsequent patents that are declared essential for the 
UMTS standard. This result is stronger for consortia that are formally allied with (related to) 
3GPP, whereas the result is weaker but still positive and statistically significant for consortia 
unrelated to 3GPP. Our findings also suggest that technical consortia are more effective 
vehicles for coordinating standards-related innovation compared to marketing consortia. 
Finally, whereas participation in informal consortia has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the likelihood to be cited by subsequent research, the same does not hold for more 
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formal consortia such as other standard-setting organizations, although this result is not 
completely robust to different estimation methods.  
The main result that consortium participation facilitates coordination of firms’ innovation 
activities is confirmed by a difference-in-difference analysis using a merger in the network of 
consortia as a source of exogenous variation. Additional evidence for this result is also 
provided by a firm-pair-level approach where we highlight the knowledge transmission 
mechanism through the effect of firm pairs’ co-memberships in specific consortia. The firm-
pair level analyses also highlight the implications of firms’ business models. The two firms 
InterDigital and Qualcomm that dominate the citing behavior in the latter half of our period of 
study operate under an IP-based business model, whereas other firms also participate in the 
product markets. 
Based on the variety of empirical evidence, we suggest that industry consortia potentially 
improve incentives for R&D because they enable the internalization of knowledge-creation 
externalities. They may also speed up standardization by facilitating both committee and 
market processes and their interactions. However, in the standard-setting context our findings 
also raise questions. Our results demonstrate that standardization takes place not only in the 
marketplace and in formal standard-setting organizations, but also in informal upstream 
consortia.   
Lack of transparency and openness of informal consortia may present challenges for less 
prominent innovators. Because of the private and opaque nature of informal consortia, it can 
be difficult for an innovating entrant to understand who makes decisions about 
standardization, where, when, and through what process. During and preceding the period of 
study, many ICT consortia were formed by a small group of industry leaders, and the 
consortia tended to have a pre-set agenda and a tiered membership structure where the 
founding firms had a more powerful position than latecomers. Moreover, we found some 
evidence of technological resources enhancing the effect of consortium connections on 
subsequent innovation for technology giants. Even if smaller innovators can find their way to 
the right meetings, their impact may be weaker.  
Moreover, when standard setting is effectively distributed to dozens of consortia, each with 
substantial membership fees and frequent meeting schedules, participation can become 
prohibitively costly for cash-constrained firms. Small firms are likely to have few technical 
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experts who are able to travel to consortium meetings, and with several potentially relevant 
consortia, this may simply not be possible.  
Finally, major firms have justified consortia as a method of speeding up standards 
development. Whereas this is a laudable goal for any industry, the actual cause of accelerated 
outcomes from consortia may be exactly that smaller firms and those who disagree with a 
subset of industry leaders are not participating. Further research would need to be conducted 
to properly understand the welfare implications of the effect of upstream consortia in 
potentially narrowing down the pool of innovations that are subsequently incorporated in the 
ex-ante compatibility standard. 
We suggest that these novel results on the organization of compatibility standardization call 
for a rethinking of standard-setting policies.  Innovation and competition policymakers might 
include informal upstream consortia in their frameworks for standardization policy, because 
this is where a significant part of coordination is done. Simple requirements for open 
membership, publicly available meeting and decision documents, and public disclosure of 
decision-making rules and rights of different members might go a long way toward dispelling 
the undemocratic reputation of informal consortia. By the same token, our results show that 
innovating firms who want to commercialize new products or technologies in network 
industries must deploy a standard-setting strategy that involves participation not only in 
formal standard-setting organizations but also in informal consortia to optimize opportunities 
to influence and align strategies with peers. 
The main limitation of our study is the well-known issue related to inference drawn from 
patent cross-citations (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Thompson  and Fox Kean, 2004). In 
particular, it is not known whether the consortium effect actually demonstrates knowledge 
flows and coordination of innovation, or whether participation in consortia simply makes 
firms aware of each other’s patents and therefore compels them to include citations to peers’ 
earlier patents for strategic reasons. Corroborating the results with other than patent data, such 
as meeting documents or interview-based case studies might be desirable.  
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Appendix 1: Description cited patents 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Grant year of the cited patents 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Technological class of the cited patents 
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Appendix 2 : Description citing patents 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Grant year of the citing patents 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Technological class of the citing patents 
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Appendix 3 : List of consortia 
 
Consortium Name 3GPP related Affected by the OMA merger 
MET No No 
WLANA No No 
SA Forum No No 
ATIS No No 
3G Americas No No 
CDG No No 
VoiceXML No No 
IPv6 Forum Yes No 
Hiperlan 2 No No 
WiFi Alliance No No 
GSA Yes No 
TTC Yes No 
Bluetooth No No 
GPP 2 No No 
UMTS Forum Yes Yes 
T1 Yes No 
SyncML No Yes 
TTA No No 
UWCC Yes No 
WAP Forum No Yes 
Wireless Village No Yes 
3GIP No No 
ARIB Yes No 
BWIF No No 
CWTS No No 
ETSI Yes No 
GSM Association Yes No 
MGIF No Yes 
MWIF No Yes 
OMA Alliance No No 
Symbian No No 
WECA No No 
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Appendix 4 : Cited patent holders 
 
Agere Matsushita 
Alcatel Matra 
ArrayComm Microsoft 
AT&T Wireless Mitsubishi 
Bell South Motorola 
BT (British Telecom) NEC 
BULL S.A. Nokia 
Cisco Systems Nortel Networks 
3Com OKI Electrics 
Infineon Technology Panasonic 
Ericsson Qualcomm 
France Telecom Racal Instruments 
Fujitsu Limited Rogers Wireless 
Golden Bridge Technology Samsung 
Hewlett Packard Seiko Epson 
Hughes Network Sharp 
ICO Global Siemens 
Intel Sony 
InterDigital  Texas Instruments 
LG Electronics Thomson 
Lucent Toshiba 
 
Appendix 5 : Control group for the OMA merger 
 
Company Name 
Hughes Network 
Agere 
ArrayComm 
BT (British Telecom) 
Bull S.A. 
Comneon 
Golden Bridge Technology 
ICO Global 
Matra 
Racal Instruments 
Rogers Wireless 
Shanghai Bell 
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Appendix 6: Results using a random effects estimation 
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a patent was cited by an essential patent 
applied in year t. Estimation method is logit with random effects. Dummy 0/3/6/9 are 
nonlinear effects for patent age. Means are computed at the cited patent level.
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratios 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratios 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Odds ratios 
(SE) 
 DV= Dummy patent cited/year 
Total memberships 0.139*** 1.149***     
 (0.018) (0.021)     
Mean  memberships -0.215*** 0.806***     
 (0.061) (0.049)     
Consortium connections 
 
  0.002*** 1.002***   
  (0.0002) (0.0002)   
Mean consortium    -0.002 0.998   
Connections   (0.001) (0.001)   
Co-membership     3.162*** 23.610*** 
     (0.168) (3.976) 
Mean  Co-membership     6.463*** 640.071*** 
     (0.645) (412.579) 
3GPP connections 0.007 1.007 0.021*** 1.021*** -0.002 0.998 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Mean 3GPPconnections -0.037 0.964 -0.081*** 0.922*** -0.035*** 0.965*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Patent age -0.109* 0.896* -0.076 0.926 -0.039 0.962 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.064) (0.062) 
Mean patent age 0.305*** 1.357*** 0.276*** 1.318*** 0.199** 1.220*** 
 (0.052) (0.070) (0.051) (0.068) (0.062) (0.075) 
Patent quality -0.068*** 0.934*** -0.067*** 0.935*** -0.074*** 0.929*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Mean patent quality 0.080*** 1.083*** 0.079*** 1.082*** 0.079*** 1.082*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Dummy 0/3/6/9 
Observations 
Number of groups 
Chi2 
Prob > chi2  
Log Likelihood 
Unit of analysis 
Number of cited firms 
Y 
6276 
1021 
418.96 
0 
-1554.269 
Cited patent 
43 
Y 
6276 
1021 
421.75 
0 
-1558.675 
Cited patent 
43 
Y 
6276 
1021 
539.77 
0 
-1142.618 
Cited patent 
43 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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 Appendix 7: Regression results with a linear probability model 
 
Table 7.1 Main results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered on patents, in parentheses under the coefficients.  
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
Table 7.2 Types of consortia 
 (1) (2) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Informal consortium 
memberships 
0.0022*  
(0.0008)  
Formal consortium 
memberships 
0.0172***  
(0.0032)  
Related consortium 
memberships 
 0.0191*** 
 (0.0022) 
Unrelated consortium 
memberships 
 -0.0013    
 (0.0008) 
3GPP connections 0.0006   0.0001    
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Dummy Cited Age 
Observations 
Number of groups 
R-sq 
Unit of analysis 
Number of cited firms 
Y 
6276 
1021 
0.0516   
Cited patent 
43 
Y 
6276 
1021 
0.1049 
Cited patent 
43 
 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered on patents, in parentheses under the coefficients. 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Total memberships 0.0050***  
 (0.0007)  
Consortium connections 
 
 0.0002*** 
 (0.00004) 
3GPP connections 0.0003  0.0007** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Dummy Age Cited 
Observations 
Number of groups 
R-sq 
Unit of analysis 
Number of cited firms 
Y 
7297 
1021 
0.1071 
Cited patent 
43 
Y 
6276 
1021 
0.0975 
Cited patent 
43 
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Table 7.3 Differences-in-differences estimation of the effects of OMA merger 
 (1) (2) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
 OMA connections 0.0007***   0.0006***   
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Other consortia connections -0.0001*  
 (0.00005)  
Formal consortia connections 
 
 
 -0.00009 
 (0.00005) 
Informal consortia connections 
 
 0.0014** 
 (0.0005) 
OMA connections after 
 
0.0005*** 0.0005** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Dummy_after -0.1831*** -0.1811***   
 (0.018) (0.018) 
3GPP connections -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Dummy Cited Age Y Y 
Number of obs 6276 6276 
Number of groups 1021 1021 
R-sq 0.1109 0.1169 
Unit of analysis Cited patent Cited patent 
Number of cited firms 43 43 
 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered on patents, in parentheses under the coefficients 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 
